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NOTES AND COMMENTS
mous materials will somewhat hinder civil terests in this area, it is important not to
and criminal action against those responsi- overlook the nature of the individual who
ble for libelous, fraudulent or obscene liter- desires to speak his mind on a controversial
ature. Yet, in balancing the conflicting in- subject.
Recent Decision:
Complaint to Bar Association
Held Privileged Communication
The right of members of the Bar to pro-
tect themselves from baseless and malicious
complaints ... must be protected.1
In a recent decision, a New York attor-
ney sued his former clients for defamatory
statements they had made to the Grievance
Committee of the Bar Association. The
plaintiff-attorney asked that the Court award
him compensatory and punitive damages
in the amount of $93,000 and the defend-
ants answered by claiming as a defense
against the libel and slander charges that
the statements were absolutely privileged
communications. The New York Supreme
Court denied the validity of this defense,
stating that it would leave an attorney com-
pletely vulnerable to baseless and malicious
complaints, and held that such a communi-
cation merited only a qualified privilege,
which in this instance could be successfully
invoked by the defendants since they had
made the statements "in good faith, without
malice, and in the belief that they were
justified." Sassower v. Himwich, (Sup. Ct.),
148 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1962, p. 10, col. 1.
The concept underlying privileged com-
munication is by no means a product of
modem jurisprudence. As far back as the
1 Sassower v. Himwich, (Sup. Ct.), 148 N.Y.L.J.,
Dec. 19, 1962, p. 10, col. 1.
reign of Edward III, there is to be found a
reference to what would now be called an
absolute privilege which constituted a com-
plete bar against any defamation action
based on a false statement alleged in court
pleadings.2 Subsequently, during the reign
of Edward IV, this privilege was extended
to prohibit "suits for defamation where a
person had been a witness on an inquisi-
tion."'3 From this limited beginning, the
theory and the application of privilege has
been greatly amplified and extended.
The concept of privileged communica-
tion, as it is known today, proceeds from
the general conviction that although sound
policy requires that certain types of conduct
be made the basis for legal liability, there
are exceptional circumstances where per-
sons engaging in such conduct should be
protected. Thus, on certain occasions, the
public good demands that an individual
speak his mind freely and fearlessly, and
hence, his statements should be absolutely
or at least qualifiedly privileged.4
Although the differences between the
absolute and the qualified privilege are
relatively simple to comprehend, the con-
sequences resulting from their application
2 4 REEVES, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 102
(2d ed. 1787). See generally 3 WOOD, AN INSTI-
TUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444-46 (9th ed.
1763).
3 4 REEVES, op. cit. supra note 2, at 101.
4 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 5.21 (1956).
are diverse and profound. One of the ear-
liest New York cases dealing with privileged
communication is Thorn v. Blanchard,5
wherein the plaintiff sought damages for an
alleged libel. The defendant had written a
defamatory petition to the Council of Ap-
pointment, charging the district attorney
with improper activity and requesting his
removal from office. In denying recovery
to the plaintiff, the court held that such a
communication was absolutely privileged,
since it comprised an integral part of a quasi-
judicial proceeding (an investigation of a
district attorney), and that therefore it was
not actionable, even if done maliciously. 6
The fundamental rationale used by the
courts in decisions granting an absolute
privilege must be understood in order to
appreciate the occasions meriting such a
privilege. Most jurisdictions agree that state-
ments made during a judicial proceeding
and material thereto are absolutely privi-
leged.' The reason for this is based on an
important public policy theory which states
that it is far better to suffer some slight
injustices due to malicious remarks rather
than to subject our judges, legislators, and
government officials to suspicion and in-
quiry regarding their every official pro-
nouncement.8 For the same reason, this
privilege is extended by analogy to quasi-
judicial proceedings, (e.g., committee in-
vestigations, and the inquiries of profes-
'5 JOHNS. R. 508 (N.Y. Ct. Err. 1809).
6 Id. at 532.
7 See PROSSER, TORTS § 95 (2d ed. 1955); RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS §H 585-89 (1938). See also
LaPorta v. Leonard, 88 N.J.L. 663, 97 Atd. 251
(1916).
8Toft v. Ketchum, 18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671
(1955). See also 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS H8
5.22, 5.23 (1956); RESTATEMENT, TORTS 8H 585,
590, 591 (1938).
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sional, religious, and semi-official civic as-
sociations).' Therefore, whether or not
there is actual malice on the part of a de-
fendant is of no concern. If a communica-
tion is held to be absolutely privileged, it
cannot by any means prove to be actionable
in libel.'
A similar example of this is City o1 Chi-
cago v. Tribune Co.,11 wherein the defend-
ant, was sued for defaming city officials
regarding their conduct in office. In finding
an absolute privilege, the Illinois court
declared that except in the case where one
is seeking to overthrow the government by
unlawful means, or is persuading others to
violate the law, all utterances against the
government, whether federal, state, or local,
should be absolutely privileged. It is advan-
tageous for the public interest, the court
said, that a citizen should be in no way
fettered in his statements, however critical,
about the government and that this is es-
pecially true where the public service and
due administration of justice are con-
cerned. 12
However, due to the general tendency of
most courts to limit strictly the application
of the absolute privilege, more often than
not the privilege granted by the courts is a
qualified privilege which, as a general rule,
the presence of malice will always defeat.' 3
9 Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Ore. 383, 347 P.2d
594 (1959).
"I Id. at 398, 347 P.2d at 602. See Simon v. Stim,
It Misc. 2d 653, 176 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct.
1958), af'd mern., 10 App. Div. 2d 647, 199
N.Y.S.2d 405 (2d Dep't 1960).
11 307 Il1. 595, 139 N.E. 86 (1923).
12 Id. at 601, 139 N.E. at 90.
"3White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266
(1844). Malice is defined as any improper motive
which induces the defendant to defame the plain-
tiff. ODGERS, SLANDER AND LIBEL 282 (6th ed.
1929). It is also defined as some motive actuating
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In White v. Nicholls,1 4 the United States
Supreme Court set down what are still to-
day, with but a few subtle distinctions, the
basic requirements for invoking successfully
the defense of qualified privilege. The de-
fendants had written a defamatory letter to
President James K. Polk, requesting that he
dismiss the Collector of Customs for the
port of Georgetown because of his political
violence, vile conduct, and underhanded
methods of obtaining political favors. The
Court stated that if an author or publisher
of an alleged libel acts in the discharge of
a public or private duty, legal or moral, he
is privileged by the occasion, which rebuts
the inference of malice and thereby casts
upon the plaintiff the burden of proving
malice in fact in order to defeat the privi-
lege. Thus, it was held that a communica-
tion is qualifiedly privileged when there
occurs a duty to inform, a publication of
the information to the proper authority and
a lack of actual malice, but only on the
specific occasion when all three factors are
simultaneously present.'"
Unfortunately, the occasions requiring an
absolute privilege and those demanding but
a qualified privilege are oftentimes not so
clearly distinguishable, and this difficulty
has given rise to the problem confronted by
the Court in the principal case. Where a
former client has made defamatory state-
ments to a bar association concerning an
the defendant, different from that which prima
facie rendered the communication privileged, and
is a motive contrary to good morals. I HARPER &
JAMES, TORTS § 5.27 at 452 (1956).
1444 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1844); accord, Toogood
v. Spyring, 1 C. M. & R. 181, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044
(1834).
15 White v. Nicholls, supra note 13, at 289; accord,
Walsh v. Bertel, 187 La. 877, 175 So. 605 (1937);
State ex rel. Zorn v. Cox, 318 Mo. 112, 298 S.W.
837 (1927); McKnight v. Hasbrouck, 17 RI. 70,
20 At. 95 (1890).
attorney, the courts of the various states
differ radically in applying a privilege to
the communication.16
The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in
Lee v. W. E. Fuetterer Battery & Supplies
Co.,II in what appears to be the first Ameri-
can decision handed down on this specific
issue, that such statements warranted a
qualified privilege only. The court rea-
soned that the public should be encouraged
to accept its duty of reporting any harmful
or injurious conduct on the part of the
members of the legal profession. Unless
such communications are privileged, the
possibility of a libel suit will deter even a
well-meaning citizen from communicating
this information to his local bar association.
The court went on to say that since the
right and duty to inform the proper authority
of any unprofessional or unethical conduct
should be fostered, such a communication
must be privileged, but only if made in good
faith. Consequently, malice or ill-will would
defeat the privilege and give rise to a cause
of action.10 The Lee case was an extension
of the long-accepted rule set down in White
v. Nicholls by the United States Supreme
Court - an application to an essentially
similar, though new, field of activity. 9 It
set a sound precedent for many subsequent
decisions, but as stated above, not all courts
were amenable to accepting this rationale. 21
In a recent Oregon case, Ramstead v.
16 Compare Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Ore. 383,
347 P.2d 594 (1959), with Lee v. W. E. Fuetterer
Battery & Supplies Co., 323 Mo. 1204, 23 S.W.2d
45 (1929).
"7 323 Mo. 1204, 23 S.W.2d 45, 61 (1929).
18 Id. at 1239, 23 S.W.2d at 63. Cf. Smith v. Kerr,
I Edm. Sel. Cas. 190 (N.Y. Cir. 1845).
19 See 15 ST. Louis L. REV. 301, 302 (1930).
20 See Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Ore. 383, 347
P.2d 594 (1959). The court stated in its opinion
that the Lee doctrine was "too narrow."
Morgan,21 the doctrine of absolute privilege
was emphatically asserted. With a factual
situation similar to that of the Lee case, the
state supreme court affirmed the lower
court's decision which construed a statute
in favor of an absolute privilege. The court
declared the statute to be unconstitutional,
amountng to a blatant interference by the
legislature with the court's powers in regard
to disbarrment proceedings. 2 Considering
the client's statements to be a part of a
quasi-judicial proceeding, the court held
that there was an absolute privilege based
on principles of public policy. The court
left unanswered the question of whether
there existed an action for malicious prose-
cution.
In Toit v. Ketchum, 23 a much criticized
opinion, 24 the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that a defamatory letter to a bar as-
sociation merited an absolute privilege, and
as such was a complete bar to any subse-
quent court action by the attorney, whether
it be in libel, slander or malicious prosecu-
tion. It therefore not only affirmed the use
of absolute privilege in such an instance but
actually extended the doctrine to thwart
completely the attorney's cause. 25
And so two divergent and apparently
irreconcilable views have taken root and
flourished in this area of law. One advocates
a stricter interpretation of the absolute
privilege and a concurrent greater use of
the qualified privilege; the other proposes
21 Ibid.; accord, Lilley v. Rooney, 61 L.J.Q.B.
,(n.s.) 727, 8 T.L.R. 642 (1892).22Ramstead v. Morgan, supra note 20, at 399, 347
P.2d at 601.
23 18 N. J. 280, 113 A.2d 671 (1955).
24 See Cowan, Torts, 10 RUTGERS L. REv. 115,
129-30 (1955); 34 CHI.-KENT L. RBV. 324 (1956).
25Toft v. Ketchum, supra note 23, at 283, 113
A.2d at 675. See Cowan, supra note 24, at 129.
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a more widespread application of the abso-
lute privilege.
Sassower v. Himwich,2 the instant case,
therefore provides an excellent and most
recent indication of the law regarding privi-
leged communications in today's legal at-
mosphere. In initiating what appears to be
the first suit of its kind in New York,2 7 the
plaintiff-attorney brought a libel suit seeking
compensatory and punitive damages for
defamation, and directed the Court's atten-
tion to the allegedly defamatory statements
made by the defendants to the New York
Bar Association Grievance Committee. The
statements in question were based on the
defendants' dissatisfaction with the attor-
ney's conduct in the settling of their affairs.
The New York Supreme Court found it
unnecessary to decide the truthfulness of
the statements since it ruled that they were
made in good faith, and hence were at least
qualifiedly privileged. Defendants had
claimed an absolute privilege, i.e., a privi-
lege which even actual malice could not
defeat. The Court, however, denied the
validity of this defense, stating that to grant
such a privilege would be to deprive attor-
neys of their most effective defense against
baseless and malicious complaints made to
the Bar Association. In upholding the attor-
25 (Sup. Ct.), 148 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1962, p. 10,
col. 1.
27 See Pecue v. West, 233 N.Y. 316, 135 N.E. 515
(1922), which is cited as authority in the instant
case. There, the defendant had sent a defamatory
letter to the district attorney charging the plaintiff
with keeping girls for immoral purposes. In ex-
plicitly limiting the application of absolute privi-
lege, the court granted a qualified privilege only,
based on the same three requirements set down in
White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 266 (1844),
i.e., the simultaneous presence of a duty to inform,
the publication to the proper authority, and good
faith.
 
